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It is widely recognised that the current transformation of energy systems around the world 
is a process particularly dependent on policy making, relative to previous socio-technical 
transitions (Unruh 2000, Meadowcroft 2005, Scrase and Smith 2012). At the same time, as 
research on sustainability transitions engages more deeply with the existing literature on 
the politics of the policy process, there is an increasingly sophisticated appreciation of the 
barriers to and complexities of constructing effective policies for such transitions (Kuzemko 
et al 2016, Kern and Rogge 2018). This article focuses on the challenges of constructing 
forward-looking policies for sustainable energy transitions in the presence of powerful 
incumbent interests. It provides an in-depth study of the process by which the rules for 
demand-side response (DSR) participation in the Capacity Market for electricity in Great 
Britain were developed. Despite the widespread assumption and statement of the power of 
incumbents in shaping policy, detailed empirical studies are relatively rare, and this is one of 
the main contributions of the article. 
* Corresponding author, m.lockwood@sussex.ac.uk 
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DSR is a process by which businesses and consumers can turn up, turn down, or shift 
demand in real-time,1 usually in response to a signal or incentive from the system operator 
or possibly from a network operator.2 The significance of DSR for energy transitions lies in 
the increase in variable renewable generation (e.g. in wind and solar) which is playing a 
central role in electricity decarbonisation. Variable generation requires greater flexibility for 
system balancing (Denholm and Hand 2011, Lund et al 2015), but traditional forms of 
flexibility on the supply side, such as oil- and gas-fired generation, are high carbon and so 
will become increasingly unavailable. New low-carbon forms of flexibility, of which DSR is 
one along with others such as pumped hydro and batteries, will become more important. 
In Great Britain, flexibility is expected to play a critical role in reducing system costs 
(Pöyry/Imperial College 2017). However, DSR in Britain has historically been less developed, 
compared with other systems, such as the US where it already plays a significant role, 
having been an element in utility integrated resource planning required by regulators for 
many years (Wilson and Biewald 2013). A forward-looking approach to policy making in 
Britain would therefore have sought to accelerate this development. Here, we focus on one 
potential opportunity to do this. 
In 2013, as part of a wider set of policies known as the Electricity Market Reform (EMR), 
Britain adopted a Capacity Market (CM) for electricity in Great Britain. The EMR was 
intended to lead to accelerated investment in low-carbon electricity generation in the form 
of new nuclear power and renewables. The concern was that a rise in variable renewables 
would increase the uncertainty of revenue for conventional dispatchable generation 
capacity through lower and more volatile wholesale prices, and that this would deter 
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investment in such capacity, just at a time that flexibility would be increasingly needed to 
manage more variable net demand. 
The CM was intended to address this concern. It takes the form of a periodic auction, 
conducted by a central buyer, into which all types of resources, including power plants, DSR, 
storage and interconnectors, can bid. The first auction was held in December 2014. Early 
clearing prices were lower than had been expected, and the CM was hailed by the 
government as a success (DECC 2015).  
However, the CM was also criticised by a wide range of observers on a number of grounds, 
one of which was the marginalisation of DSR in the main auctions (Littlecott 2014; Cornwall 
Energy 2015; Whitehead 2015; ECIU 2016, IPPR 2016). Overall, DSR has to date provided 
only around 1.5% of contracted resource in these auctions (Table 1). Durwall (2015) 
described the CM as a ‘damp squib’ for DSR, and the former Chair of the Energy and Climate 
Change Select Committee, Tim Yeo, argued that DSR ‘has been disadvantaged in the 
auctions…meaning costs and emissions could be higher than necessary’ (quoted in The 
Guardian 2015). Indeed, the initial rules for DSR in the CM were so controversial that the 
energy services firm Tempus brought a legal challenge against the granting of State Aid 
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December 2014 T-4 From 2018/19 49.3 0.35% £  956.4m 
December 2015 T-4 From 2019/20 46.4 1.3% £  834.4m 
December 2016  T-4 From 2020/21 52.4 2.69% £1,179.6m 
February 2017 T-1 From 2017/18 54.4 0.39% £   372.5m 
February 2018 T-4 From 2021/22 50.4 2.39% £    423.4m 
February 2018 T-1 From 2018/19   5.7 7.47% £      34.2m 
January 2020 T-3 From 2022/23 45.1 1.19% £    290.2m 
Total   303.7 1.51% £4,090.7m 
Source: EMR Delivery Body 
Note: There are a number of different types of auction. The primary auction is held 3 or 4 years ahead of the 
delivery year, so is known as a T-3 or T-4 auction. Nearer the time, a year ahead, a T-1 auction can also be held, 
to ‘fine-tune’ the amount of capacity contracted. 
 
 
The CM was developed over a period in which the British electricity system was beginning to 
change, and by the time of the first auction that change was accelerating rapidly. 
Distributed generation was booming, the costs of electrical storage were starting to fall, and 
expectations about the potential of DSR were also becoming much more serious. In this 
context, the CM could have offered more of a bridge to the future energy system by 
prioritising the development of new resources, but in practice it ended up looking like a 
backward-looking instrument. This outcome stands in stark contrast with the apparent 
enthusiasm for a major role for DSR in the CM expressed at a senior level early on in the 
process.4 While there have been some improvements in DSR participation rules since 2014, 
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it is therefore all the more puzzling why DSR was originally brought into the CM on terms 
that seemed unfavourable.  
A widely held view is that the design of the CM was heavily influenced by lobbying from 
large powerful generation interests. This article tests this view. To guide our analysis we 
draw on the literature on mechanisms of corporate influence, including the deployment of 
resources in public-facing strategies of influence, the use of networks with senior policy 
makers, and the use of ideas in the attempt to get the latter to internalise the commercial 
interests of corporate actors. 
Because the focus here is on a single case study of the politics of policy development, 
process-tracing (e.g. Beach and Pedersen 2013) was adopted as the appropriate 
methodological approach. We draw on a range of sources, but two are particularly 
important: a set of interviews with individuals who had participated in decision making in 
the CM process, who had been in corporations communicating with decision makers, and 
who had been close observers of the process (see Appendix 1 for details), and consultation 
documents published by the government, along with submissions to those consultations. 
The remainder of the article is organised as follows. In the next section we lay out the 
analytical and methodological approach. Section 3 provides context by laying out the origins 
of the CM and its overall development. The evidence on the process by which the original 
rules for DSR in the CM were constructed is then laid out in Section 4. In section 5 we assess 
that evidence in light of the framework outlined in section 2 and draw out some of the 
implications for governing sustainable energy transitions, with some recommendations for 
producing a more forward-looking approach in Britain and elsewhere. 
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2. Analytical and methodological approach 
2.1 Analytical approach 
A widely held view amongst observers of the energy industry is that the formulation and 
design of the CM was heavily influenced by lobbying from large powerful generation 
interests.5 For example, the advocacy group E3G stated that: 
‘…the current UK Capacity Market proposals…present barriers to the deployment of 
demand side response, demand reduction, and interconnection solutions to the 
challenge of securing appropriate resource adequacy in a changing market. The 
current proposals are suited for incumbents, not innovators.’ (Littlecott 2014: 3) 
Similar arguments were put forward by Aldridge (2014) and Baker and Hogan (2014). These 
specific concerns about the CM are instances of a widely held view that large companies in 
the British energy sector have considerable influence over policy more broadly (e.g. Bawden 
2015).  
It is important to note that we see these arguments as hypotheses to be assessed rather 
than necessarily true. While it is plausible that incumbents will lobby to protect their 
interests, it does not follow that they will always succeed, or that their interests should be 
assumed to be static. It is also important to recognise that the CM was part of a wider 
electricity sector package in the form of the EMR – utilities had already started to invest in 
renewables, in part because the nature of policy and regulatory design (Stenzel and Frenzel 
2008), which in turn began to change the nature of their interests. The carbon price floor 
element of the EMR would hurt coal-fired generation, but the package offered a quid pro 
quo in the form of support for new nuclear and a capacity mechanism see by policy makers 
at least, as supporting gas-fired generation. The questions examined here are therefore how 
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incumbents constructed their interests in relation to the CM, whether and how they lobbied 
in pursuit of those interests, and finally whether there is any evidence that we can attribute 
the nature of policy decisions to those efforts. 
This literature suggests that incumbents such companies will pursue a number of routes to 
this end. One is that they will tend to have a privileged access to policy makers through a set 
of ‘relational networks and close contacts’ (Geels 2014: 26) that they can lobby through (see 
also Wilks 2013). A second is that companies deploy their considerable material resources 
(e.g. Yackee and Yackee 2006) in more public strategies for influencing via information and 
more confrontational strategies such as legal challenge (see also Smink et al 2015). A third, 
more subtle mechanism is the deployment of ideas. Geels (2014: 27) sees this as a process 
by which ‘market elites’ seek, through a range of formal and informal verbal and written 
communication, to influence the way that policy makers think, not only about specific 
policies, but also about ‘basic directions, problem definitions and desired solutions.’ Bell 
(2012) also places emphasis on the importance of actors’ deployment of ideas, but reminds 
us that policy makers are not a blank state, and will hold their own ideas, echoing Hall’s 
(1993) work on policy paradigms. 
Thus overall, if corporate influence played a part in preventing a more forward-looking 
design for the CM that favoured the development of DSR, we would expect to find evidence 
of incumbents pursuing one or more of these routes. To operationalise the testing of these 
expectations we need to identify potential ‘incumbents’. We argue that of relevance here 
are companies with significant assets in electricity generation, and we include two groups in 
particular. The first is the ‘Big Six’ group of companies which are vertically integrated in 
electricity generation and supply.6 Between them these companies had a 65% market share 
8 
 
in generation of electricity in 2010 (BNEF 2012). Their generation portfolios were dominated 
by thermal capacity, split fairly evenly between gas- and coal-fired capacity, but with 
Centrica and EDF especially also having significant nuclear assets arising from the acquisition 
of British Energy in 2009.  
The Big Six are particularly central to this study, since they are the most visible and powerful 
group. However, there is another group comprising a number of ‘second tier’ electricity 
companies with thermal generating assets but no significant supply businesses. This includes 
members of the Independent Generators Group (International Power, DONG UK, 
Eggborough Power Ltd, Drax Power Ltd, InterGen, and ConocoPhillips), and ESB 
International. These companies were also heavily invested in thermal fossil fuel capacity, 
particularly coal and combined-cycle gas turbines (CCGTs) (DECC 2012a).  
Between them, these two groups of companies – i.e. the Big Six and the second tier 
generators – owned 96% of GB electricity generating capacity in 2012, and 94% of fossil-fuel 
thermal generation. The interests of these companies were such that DSR would be 
expected to be a direct competitor for generation in the CM, and would also undermine 
revenues in the wholesale market. One would thus expect owners of major generation 
assets to be opposed to a major role for DSR. The Big Six were integrated into supply, which 
means that they would also lose supply revenue from DSR at peak periods from half-hourly 
metered customers. A possible counter-argument would be that, because they had 
relationships with electricity consumers, these companies might have seen the 
development of DSR services to other company’s customers through the CM as a new, 
alternative revenue stream. However, while some companies (e.g. British Gas/Centrica, 
E.On UK) did operate energy services businesses, the vast bulk of revenue for the Big Six 
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came from generation and supply, and their core company capabilities were in these latter 
areas. 
 
2.2 Methodology, methods and sources 
Because the focus here is on a single case study of the politics of policy development, 
process-tracing is appropriate methodology (Beach and Pedersen 2013, Bennett and 
Checkel 2015). In establishing causal mechanisms, Beach and Pedersen (2013: 46-47) argue 
the need to identify specific entities at each stage of a chain, along with activities that these 
entities undertake. In this case, the key entities we are interested in are the large corporate 
generators (hypothesised as incumbents) and senior decision makers (politicians and 
officials), while the activities include networking, the transfer of ideas and the deployment 
of corporate strategies for influence in various forms including lobbying, with the aim of 
influencing policy. 
The evidence used in this study is drawn as much as possible from a range of different 
sources, but two of these are particularly important: 
 Interviews with individuals who had participated in the process of developing the 
CM, and those who had been close observers of the process (see Appendix 1 for 
details). There is some sensitivity about the topic of corporate influence, with both 
corporate and government interviewees having an incentive to deny or play down 
the possibility that it occurred. We attempted to address this problem by using 
interview schedules that did not ask direct questions about lobbying. Interviewees 
with independent observers are an important source of triangulation here, but 
whereas their evidence may not be biased, it may also be less accurate. It should 
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also be borne in mind that the events being studied occurred in the period from the 
late 2000s up to 2014, whereas the interviews were undertaken during 2016-18. The 
memories of interviewees, especially about timing and sequencing of events, may 
not always be accurate, so documentary forms of evidence are also important. 
 Consultation documents and submissions. There were a number of points in the 
evolution of the CM where the government published consultation documents and 
the accompanying submissions. In particular we draw on submissions to the 
December 2010 EMR consultation (DECC 2010) and the July 2011 consultation on the 
Capacity Market (DECC 2011a).7 We also draw on submissions and oral evidence to 
two inquiries on the EMR conducted by the House of Commons Energy and Climate 
Change Committee (ECCC 2011, 2012).  
In addition, the paper also draws on a range of other sources including: information on 
meetings between corporate actors and Ministers; speeches and statements by politicians 
and corporate CEOs, and media reports.  
Finally, it should be noted that there are some particular problems relating to evidence in 
the study of corporate influence through lobbying. Much of this type of activity happens 
behind closed doors. Publicly available documents rarely contain sensitive information 
which may nevertheless be shared between actors, and which may often highlight specific 
commercial interests and explain the approach of individual actors. 
 
3. The origins of the Capacity Market 
In the late 2000s, UK government commitments to decarbonise and to promote renewable 
electricity became more serious, with the adoption of the 2008 Climate Change Act and 
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agreement on the 2009 EU Renewables Directive, which led to the adoption of new 2020 
targets. At the same time, the governing Labour Party had reversed its earlier stance on 
nuclear and was keen to see new plants built (Mitchell 2008: 105-115). Responding to 
government signalling, by the end of the 2000s all the Big Six companies were involved in 
one of a number of competing nuclear new build consortia.8 However, new nuclear power 
could not be supported by the Renewables Obligation, and an overt subsidy for nuclear 
would be ruled out under State Aid rules. This mean that both government and industry had 
an interest in a support mechanism that could be framed as being for ‘low carbon’ 
generation.  
Over the period from 2009 to 2013, a set of policies known as the Electricity Market Reform 
(EMR) were developed.9 The EMR involved four new elements: a new form of support for 
‘low carbon’ electricity (renewables but also new nuclear power); a plant-level Emissions 
Performance Standard for greenhouse gas emissions; a Carbon Price Support for allowances 
in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, and a Capacity Market. 
The classic argument for a capacity mechanism is based on a ‘missing money’ problem in 
energy-only markets (Joskow 2008). However, much of the debate in the case of the GB 
Capacity Market was about ‘missing markets’ (Newbery and Grubb 2015: 66), i.e. a collapse 
in investment in conventional generation capacity arising from uncertainty created by high 
levels of variable renewables leading to reduced and more volatile wholesale prices 
(Cramton et al 2013). As both renewables and new nuclear had frameworks of support in 
the EMR, the argument was that conventional thermal capacity, especially CCGT plants, 
needed for back-up, would also need a support policy.  
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It is important to note that at the time of the debate about whether to adopt a capacity 
mechanism in Britain, there was no clear academic consensus (IEA 2016: 97). Many 
jurisdictions, such as Australia’s NEM, had energy-only markets. Other countries going 
through debates about whether or not to adopt a capacity mechanism, such as Germany, 
did eventually not do so, partly because the case for impending scarcity was even weaker 
than in Britain, but also because of concerns about lobbying and excessive cost (Lehmann et 
al 2015). Where there were capacity mechanisms these varied widely in design, with some 
with some jurisdictions having capacity payments, some using reliability standards and 
others using capacity markets (Spees et al 2013, Battle and Rodilla 2010). However, there 
were also clear examples of capacity markets in the US, particularly the PJM and ISO-New 
England, with successful experiences of a significant and increasing role for DSR (Hurley et al 
2013, Gottstein and Schwartz 2010). 
In the late 2000s, an important forum for informal high level dialogue between the 
Department for Energy and Climate Change and the Big Six about the EMR was a body called 
the UK Business Council for Sustainable Energy (UKBCSE).10 Originally founded in 2001 at the 
time of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, the UKBCSE evolved into a forum 
for chief executives from the Big Six and National Grid to meet both amongst themselves 
and with senior figures in government. By the mid-2000s it had become the most important 
energy industry forum, facilitating high-level contact between the Big Six and DECC, 
including regular informal dinners with the Secretary of State and Permanent Secretary, as 
well as meetings with lower-level officials.11 It also provided an important coordinating 
arena for companies to discuss and collate their positions on the EMR, with a working group 
and an EMR strategy day for senior staff in the autumn of 2010.12 
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A majority (but not all)13 of the Big Six and the second-tier generators were in favour of a 
capacity mechanism. These companies were to an extent pushing on an open door, since 
following the 2010 general election, the incoming Coalition government was keen to be 
seen to be taking action on energy, and by 2011 was also becoming increasingly concerned 
about what it saw as a medium-term capacity problem. The intention to legislate for a 
mechanism was confirmed in the July 2011 White Paper, Planning our Electric Future (DECC 
2011a). 
Once the decision to have a capacity mechanism of some sort was made, attention turned 
to whether this would be a targeted mechanism in the form of a Strategic Reserve (SR), in 
which capacity would be withheld from the wholesale market, or a market-wide mechanism 
in which all or most generators could participate while remaining in the market. The 
government’s initial preference was for a SR mechanism, on cost grounds. However, by the 
end of 2011 the government announced that it would choose a market-wide approach 
(DECC 2011b: 22). This was in part due to heavy lobbying by the major generators using a 
‘slippery slope’ argument against SR, i.e. a SR would reduce the rewards available in the 
wholesale market, leading potential investors in new plant to hold back, which would 
increase the amount of capacity required to be tendered for in the SR, eventually leading to 
all capacity ending up in the SR (Lockwood 2017). But according to sources from within 
government the decision was also taken because of increasing concerns about the volume 
of future capacity that would be required in the future, with that concern symbolised by the 
idea of an extended winter anti-cyclone with low wind generation and high demand.14 
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It was only after these broad dimensions of the CM had been decided that attention moved 
to the terms of which DSR would be able to participate.  It is to this process that we now 
turn. 
 
4. Development of the DSR rules in the CM 
4.1 The early debate 
Early on in the process senior politicians were enthusiastic about DSR in the CM. Giving 
evidence to the House of Commons Energy and Climate Change Committee in the spring of 
2011, the then Secretary of State, Chris Huhne, said:  
‘Absolutely crucially, we envisage [the capacity mechanism] supporting the 
negawatts concept, that is, supporting an ability to pay companies that might go into 
a particular area and say “We will pay all of the consumers in this area a certain 
amount or install a gadget that will turn off the fridge and the freezer for those few 
minutes over the Coronation Street advertising break. It won’t affect their ability to 
keep their frozen peas frozen, but it will save us the need for a peaking plant.”’. 
(ECCC 2011: 116) 
Similar statements were made by the Energy Minster, and by the Director General for 
Energy Markets and Infrastructure at DECC, Simon Virley, who described DSR as ‘the real 
prize’ (ECCC 2011: Ev 117). 
There is some evidence that this interest at senior levels was partly influenced by lobbying 
by civil society organisations including E3G, Friends of the Earth,15 Green Alliance16 and 
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WWF (2013) and by technical expert groups such as the Regulatory Assistance Project (RAP) 
(Gottstein and Schwartz 2010, Gottstein and Skillings 2012):  
‘Greg Barker [then Minister for Climate Change] was keen on this, prompted by E3G, 
ECF – they were pushing.’17 
‘[RAP] had influence early on…was doing a lot of work for DECC for free…argued the 
whole necessity of a CM originated from a CfD…this is how you get DSR in…you need 
a CM in order to get revenue streams for DSR.’18 
Consistent with early support, the 2010 EMR Consultation document and the 2011 White 
Paper both distinguished DSR as a separate resource from generation (DECC 2010: 82-91; 
DECC 2011a; 63, 77).  
In their submissions to the 2010 and 2011 consultations, many corporate actors appeared to 
argue for equivalent treatment for generation and DSR (e.g. E.ON 2010, 2011, SSE 2010, 
International Power 2010, Drax 2010, 2011, InterGen 2010, ESB 2011), and some were 
supportive of DSR in principle.19 Support was also expressed by senior representatives of the 
Big Six to the Energy and Climate Change Committee. For example, Sarwjit Sambhi, 
Managing Director of Power Generation for Centrica, told the Committee that:  
‘Our assumption, and I think DECC’s assumption, is that demand side response will 
participate in the capacity market…I think it is a great opportunity to have innovation 
in the electricity market.’ (ECCC 2012: Ev 21).  
However, despite these kinds of statements, several participants in or close observers of the 
process saw political and industry commitment to DSR as merely rhetorical: 
16 
 
‘…the fundamental driver was always new build. What [politicians] wanted was 
system adequacy in the long term…they pretended they wanted DSR because of 
lobbying.’20 
‘…the capacity market was all about capacity from the outset.’21 
‘The original genesis of the Capacity Market had nothing to do with DSR. DSR came 
in…under pressure from E3G and others…’22 
Consonant with this interpretation, corporate actors also fired warning shots about what 
they saw as the inferior nature of DSR as compared with conventional generation. One 
criticism was that DSR would only be of use in solving resource adequacy problems over 
short time periods (e.g. Scottish Power 2010, 2011, International Power 2010, ESB 
International 2011). Another set of arguments was about reliability and difficulties of 
establishing baselines (EDF 2011, Scottish Power 2010, International Power 2011). E.ON 
(2010: 17) argued that DSR and storage should be eligible in a capacity mechanism, but that 
there was a need to ‘demonstrate that they can genuinely provide value and that the 
contracted capacity can be delivered when required.’ 
The issue of reliability of delivery did emerge as a concern within DECC, according to an 
official playing a senior role in the EMR overall.23 Certainly, policy makers in the UK lacked 
experience of DSR, relative to those in the US. Despite visits to US markets and documentary 
evidence showing good overall performance of DSR delivery as well as a significant role in 
helping systems cope with shocks in 2013 and 2014 (e.g. PJM 2013, 2014, Hurley et al 2013), 
uncertainty about the approach within the context of a desire to reduce uncertainty may 
have worked against it.24 However, according to the same source, reliability of delivery 




4.2 Influencing perceptions of a capacity crunch 
Over the period from early 2011 onwards, the government began to come under increasing 
pressure from the large generators, and especially the Big Six, to get a capacity mechanism 
in place urgently. The capacity margin in the early 2010s was actually high by recent 
historical standards, but was forecast to fall rapidly once coal-fired and nuclear plants closed 
from 2015 onwards (DECC 2011a: 65). However, it was also the case that over the period 
that the Capacity Market was being developed the economics of gas-fired power generation 
were difficult relative to coal, and over the early 2010s a number of plants were mothballed 
or closed. Paradoxically, these actions reflected a glut of capacity, but some companies used 
these closures to signal the possibility of a future capacity crunch and the urgency of signals 
for new investment. For example, at the end of June 2011, just ahead of the publication of 
the EMR White Paper, the CEO of Centrica Sam Laidlaw gave a speech (widely covered in the 
media) in which he claimed that:  
‘The clock is ticking. In my view, we as a nation have got one year in which to take 
action, or our carbon reduction targets may have to be sacrificed in the interests of 
safeguarding the security of our energy supplies.’25 
There were similar messages from EDF, Intergen, International Power, E.On and RWE 
through 2012. 2013 started with a statement in January from Scottish Power’s Chief 
Corporate Officer, Keith Anderson, arguing that: 
‘…it is crucial to ensure that progress is made on the Government’s current delivery 
timetable with…a capacity mechanism being introduced in 2014. Ofgem’s evidence 
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on security of supply and accelerated closure of coal-fired power stations means that 
there is a need to progress with a first capacity auction in 2014.’26 
SSE made similar statements in March 201327 and Centrica again in April (Gosden 2013). 
While the basis for this pressure was challenged (described as ‘scaremongering’ by Pollitt, 
quoted in Tsagas 2014) the steady stream of warnings put enormous pressure on the 
government to deliver the CM quickly. 
 
4.3 The development of detailed rules 
The DSR industry had also responded to the 2010 and 2011 consultations. Some companies 
gave guidance on aspects of CM design that they thought would be supportive of the 
development of DSR. Kiwi Power (2010) stressed the importance of advance (i.e. day ahead) 
notification for deployment of DSR within the contract period, and argued that the expected 
low frequencies of utilisations would work better for DSR, with some ability to opt out of 
certain windows, with an event duration of around 2-4 hours being realistic (Kiwi Power 
2011). They also raised concerns that excessively high penalties for non-delivery would 
make participation too risky for DSR, and that a qualification process that requires DSR 
providers to have committed customers’ contracts several years ahead of programme start 
would exclude too many potential providers. They were also concerned that in other 
capacity markets, run-up and run-down rates had been designed around generators, and did 
not fit DSR providers well. EnerNOC (2011) emphasised the need for a stable, durable 
mechanism, as an on-and-off mechanism would deter companies offering DSR. They also 
noted that potential DSR participants would want clarity on expected frequency of dispatch, 
length of expected dispatch and temporal distribution (e.g. more than once a week). 
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However, when it was published in 2012 none of these ideas appeared in the draft Energy 
Bill. The Bill was roundly criticised by the Energy and Climate Change Committee as: 
‘…fundamentally flawed by the lack of consideration given to demand-side measures.’ (ECCC 
2012: 16). It was not until the publication of an EMR Policy Overview document at the end 
of 2012 that more detailed proposals for the treatment of DSR started to emerge. This 
document first introduced the idea of ‘transitional arrangements to support the 
development of DSR and storage to better enable their participation in the Capacity Market’ 
(DECC 2012b: 20), including special auctions for DSR and storage in 2014 for delivery in 
2015-2017 aimed at building the capacity of the DSR and storage industries. 
In early 2013, DECC set up a CM Expert Group28 which worked over the winter and early 
spring of 2013. The role of the Group was to provide expert input and feedback, and it 
covered a large amount of ground in the detailed design of the CM, including the treatment 
of DSR. It was thus potentially influential, especially in the deployment of ideas about the 
nature of both the resource adequacy problem and detailed design of solutions. However, 
the Group included only one representative from a DSR firm, and none from the 
organisations that had championed the role of DSR in a capacity mechanism early in the 
process. The US economist Steven Stoft was also on the Group as a consultant, but overall 
the large incumbent generators dominated, with seven out of the thirteen members of the 
Group being from the Big Six and the IGG.29 The Expert Group discussed DSR in March 2013, 
reviewing DECC’s proposals.  
In April 2013, DECC then proposed the creation of a ‘Collaborative Development’ (CD) 
process,30 described as ‘a phase of EMR in which industry works closely with DECC and 
delivery partners on developing the detailed design of EMR systems and processes for 
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implementation’.31 The process was overseen by an Implementation Steering Group,32 
which in addition to members from DECC and Ofgem, had 16 industry members, of which 
nine came from Big Six and second-tier generators. Other members included 
representatives of DSR firms and industrial energy users (although according to one 
observer close to the DSR industry, some of these representatives felt in retrospective that 
they ‘were only there to tick boxes’ 33). The CD process involved a set of working groups, 
including one dedicated to the CM, which held a series of intensive workshops between 
mid-August 2013 and the end of September 2013 and then follow up meetings in December 
2013 and January 2014. These covered the qualification and auction process, the capacity 
agreement, the governance process, financial aspects, including credit requirements, and 
DSR.  
At this stage, an important factor in the decisions taken appears to have been a lack of 
willingness and time on the part of officials to engage with the detailed rules from the point 
of view of what was a more marginal industry than generation. 
‘The rush to finish, and a little bit of ‘Project Fear’ perhaps…you need gigawatts, to 
get them moving now, which turned out not to be true in the end. But that fear, 
coupled with the desire to get the thing over the line, resulted in neglect of details 
that are far more significant to demand response than they appear to be to someone 
who’s not really looking at it...’ 
 ‘There was a bit of table-thumping going on…Let’s get it done, let’s get it over the 
line, let’s get it finished,…tie a ribbon on it…which resulted in an unwillingness to 




4.4 Contract length and cost recovery 
In October 2013 DECC published a consultation document on an EMR Implementation Plan 
(DECC 2013), which contained detailed proposals for the treatment of DSR. These proposals 
divided opinion between some of the major generating companies on the one hand and the 
DSR industry on the other, ‘with some respondents claiming that DSR could not operate in 
the Capacity Market as currently envisaged…’ (DECC (2014a: 102). The DSR industry was 
unhappy with many of the proposals, including what they saw as unfair bid bond amounts, a 
cumbersome pre-qualification process, and unsatisfactory spot test arrangements for 
assurance, all of which deterred effective participation. 
Within this general picture, two areas proved particularly controversial. One related to 
contract length and auction participation. The implementation plan proposed that DSR 
could participate in three types of auction: 
 The main T-4 auctions, held 4 years ahead of delivery, where the bulk of capacity 
would be auctioned for. The first of these would be in 2014 for delivery in 2018/19  
 T-1 auctions, held a year ahead of delivery, which were for ‘fine tuning’ capacity 
procurement nearer delivery time. The first of these would be in 2017 for delivery in 
2018/19  
 Transitional arrangement (TA) auctions for DSR, which were to be held in 2015 and 
2016.  
However, the proposed rules did not allow a DSR provider who had entered the T-4 auctions 
in 2014 or 2015 to subsequently enter a TA auction. A paper commissioned by some of the 
DSR firms in 2014 later argued that this was a serious disincentive to enter the larger T-4 
auction, and prevented DSR providers from building up a longer set of contracts through a 
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number of different auctions, to help grow the DSR sector (NERA 2014). It was seen by those 
in the DSR industry as a form of discrimination.35 
The argument for longer contracts was based on the experience in the industry that while 
DSR may involve lower capital costs than generator, it still involves a degree of investment 
and commitment from large energy users, which will not be forthcoming on the prospect of 
only a single year’s revenue.36 This point was also made in 2014 by Jeremy Nicholson of the 
Energy Intensive User Group in evidence to the Energy and Climate Change Committee: 
‘I think it is strange, and some of us have struggled to understand why this should be 
the case, that there is not a demand-side product for more than a year’s duration. 
After all, some businesses will have to make physical investments. They may not 
recover the costs of those investments in order to provide demand-side service that 
can be certified and delivered reliably and so on, of the sort we would all want, 
competing against supply. If those costs cannot be recovered within a year or so, it is 
going to make the commercial case for their involvement rather problematic.’37 
The NERA report (2014) also pointed out that whereas DSR providers could only access one 
year contracts, new gas plants could access contracts of up to 15 years, while refurbishing 
generators (most likely to be coal plants) could get three year contracts. However, despite 
these concerns raised by the DSR industry, the proposals for auction participation and 
contract lengths for DSR were carried over into the final design announced in 2014. 
A second key issue was about the funding of the CM. It was always envisaged that the cost 
of paying CM providers would ultimately be recovered through suppliers levying charges on 
electricity consumers. The proposal in the Implementation Plan was that the proportion of 
the annual amount payable by each supplier would be determined by the supplier’s market 
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share at the time of system peak demand, in particular the forecast average demand of the 
supplier’s customers across the three half-hourly periods of annual peak demand, known as 
the ‘Triad’ (DECC 2013: 209). Unlike some other jurisdictions with capacity markets, for 
example in the US, the GB retail market is fully liberalised. While the ability of suppliers to 
pass costs through to small consumers in a targeted way was limited by metering 
technology, it was expected that they would pass the costs of the CM through to half-hourly 
metered large consumers proportionately to peak demand. This wold give an incentive for 
large consumers to reduce demand at these peak periods, thereby stimulating the DSR 
market. 
The EMR Implementation Plan consultation formally closed on Christmas Eve 2013. 
However, this was not the end of the story. According to one close observer of the energy 
industry,38 Energy UK, the successor to the UKBCSE, lobbied the government on cost 
recovery over Christmas 2013 and by early January 2014 the approach had been changed. 
The issue was discussed by the CM Expert Group at which DECC tabled a document that 
noted that: 
‘Suppliers raised concerns around this peak charging approach in advance of, and in 
response to, the EMR implementation consultation…Though there is no unanimously 
supported alternative, there is broad support from large suppliers for basing charges 
on suppliers’ forecast share of demand over the entire year…’ (DECC 2014b: 1)  
The argument of the suppliers on cost recovery focused on the difficulty of forecasting 
market share, and predicting Triad periods, although the tabled document notes that:  
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‘Suppliers have not supplied any quantitative evidence to substantiate these 
concerns, e.g. to demonstrate the relative volatility of Triad periods and the difficulty 
of Triad forecasting’ (DECC 2014b: 3).  
However, some close to the DSR industry argue that the real interests of suppliers lay in the 
generation arms of their vertically integrated businesses.39 Placing cost recovery on Triad 
periods would have provided a strong incentive for Triad avoidance, which would have 
reduced peak demand and in turn generators’ revenue. It would have also reduced the 
estimated required capacity for future auctions and so future CM payments. On this view 
the argument for spreading cost recovery over a wider period was less about predicting 
demand and more about bringing forward new gas capacity to bulk up generation in the 
winter. 
Arguing that it wanted to keep some link between cost recovery and periods of high 
demand, DECC proposed that cost recovery be based on the forecast market shares of 
suppliers for the hours of 4-7 pm on weekdays over the whole of the period November to 
February inclusive, i.e. around 100 days, which it saw as a ‘reasonable compromise which 
takes account of the principle [sic] concerns from suppliers relating to the variability of a 
peak charge approach without losing the demand reduction incentive.’ 
For the managing director of a DSR firm: 
 ‘The manner in which that decision was taken was very poor. The result that they 
arrived at was not one of the options on which they consulted…Christmas Eve 2013 
was the famous day, and the result of that that came out afterwards was a radical 
change that was a fait accompli, we couldn’t influence it.’40 
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More widely, there are reports of representatives of the DSR industry in CD meetings being 
‘aggressively shouted down’41 by incumbents:  
‘And also they set up lots of working groups, that were again highly populated by 
industry people, and you know, you heard stories about how viciously they opposed 
…demand response providers and it all got quite vicious because they thought they 
were actually taking away their generation revenues.’42 
The British government gained State Aid approval for the CM from the European 
Commission in July 2014. However, in December 2014 the DSR company Tempus Energy 
brought a challenge to the European General Court arguing that State Aid approval was 
unlawful, 43  on the grounds that the CM discriminated against DSR providers, in particular: 
that DSR participants could obtain only one-year duration contracts, compared with 3-15 
year contracts for new and refurbished generating plants; that DSR participants were forced 
to choose between transitional and enduring auctions; that the final cost recovery 
mechanism was not proportionate; that capacity events in the main auction were not time-
bound; that the bid bond arrangements were discriminatory and that there was a failure to 
recognise the value of avoided transmission and distribution costs in the CM contracts. In 
2018 the General Court ruled in favour of the Tempus Energy challenge, and State Aid 
approval was annulled,44 leading to the UK government suspending payments within the 
CM. The ruling required the Commission to undertake a new review for State Aid approval, 
which was given in October 2019.45 At the same time, the UK government committed to 
making a number of changes to the CM design to meet the complaints raised by Tempus 




5. Conclusions and policy implications 
This article has assessed the argument that the terms on which DSR originally entered the 
GB Capacity Market for electricity were strongly influenced by lobbying from large 
companies with existing generation assets. It provides a detailed empirical case relating to 
the wider argument that incumbents will play a major role in slowing and shaping 
sustainable energy transformations. 
If incumbent influence did indeed play a significant role in the design process for DSR rules 
in the CM we would expect to find evidence that the major generators had deployed public 
facing strategies, had been able to draw on close networks of contacts and networks with 
senior policy makers, and that the latter had internalised the ideas and interests of the 
former. 
The account presented above suggests that there is indeed fairly clear evidence for all three 
of these criteria. It is clear that some Big Six and second-tier generating companies lobbied 
at certain points to close down what they framed as special treatment for DSR, for example 
in bid bond levels and contract length, and to change the proposed triad option for cost pass 
through. In this lobbying incumbents deployed a set of ideas about DSR, especially that it 
was inferior to generation capacity in both duration and reliability of delivery. Uncertainty in 
the minds of policy makers about the performance of DSR, given their very limited 
experience of it relative to, for example, US markets, may have made them particular 
receptive to such ideas, especially as they were under considerable political pressure to 
reduce uncertainty with some urgency. The argument about duration rested in turn on the 
earlier efforts of some large corporate generators to frame the problem as being about 
capacity as opposed to flexibility. While some NGOs and sector think tanks had argued that 
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the CM was an opportunity to accelerate the development of DSR in the UK, there is no 
evidence that this view had influence in the later detailed design phase, nor that academic 
input played a major role. 
Institutional arrangements also favoured large corporate actors, providing points of contact 
and the use of existing networks. Up until 2012 the UKBCSE gave the chief executives of the 
Big Six direct and privileged access to senior politicians and officials in an informal setting. In 
the later stages of the CM the mechanisms of the Expert Group and the Collaborative 
Development process were explicitly designed to bring industry and policy makers together, 
and the construction of these mechanisms tended to give the larger generators strong 
representation. There were of course other coalitions and actor networks46 that attempted 
to influence the CM rules. In this case, the CM was indeed the subject of much ‘intense 
lobbying’47 not only from the large generators but also from NGOs and think tanks making 
the case for DSR in general, and DSR firms pressing on the  details of the rules. However, 
most DSR aggregators were relatively new at this stage, and all (with the possible exception 
of the US firm EnerNOC) were relatively small, and could not match the capacity of the large 
generators to mobilise collection and analysis of information or the commissioning of 
modelling.48 This inequality of resources mattered because, while DSR started off in the CM 
as a relatively high profile issue, it quickly slid down the political agenda (again in part as a 
response to fears about a capacity crunch). 
Another barrier to the arguments of DSR providers that specific aspects of the rules of the 
CM did not work for them was a strong desire by officials to fast track the setting up of the 
CM, and a resulting unwillingness to engage on details given limited time and resources. In 
turn, this sense of urgency was in part created by a running campaign through 2011 to 2013 
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by the larger generators which drove a fear of a looming capacity crunch. The rules for DSR 
were not the primary target of this campaign, but it ended up having a major effect on 
them. 
Attribution in studies such as the present one that adopt a process tracing methodology can 
never be perfect; the approach is essentially Bayesian in nature (Beach and Pedersen 2013). 
However, we argue that the strength of the research rests on the use of several different 
sources of evidence and a detailed study of the policy process. Such studies of energy policy 
processes remain relatively rare, but more are essential for understanding energy transitions 
and for recommending the types of governance arrangements that are needed to accelerate 
such transitions. 
In terms of specific rules within the CM, there have been a number of changes subsequent 
to 2014 that have improved the situation, in response to proposals from the DSR industry 
itself and arising from the Tempus case.49 However, given the focus of this study, 
recommendations here focus on the process of policy making within sustainable energy 
transitions, given the realities of incumbent lobbying. 
One possible response is to take steps within government departments and other decision 
making organisations to foster greater explicit self-awareness about industry lobbying.50 
However, at least in jurisdictions with market-based energy systems, governments have a 
structural dependency on the energy industry, with quite strong political incentives to 
accede to demands to create conditions for investment (e.g. Wilks 2013: 129). This situation 
implies that there is a need to involve others who do not share those incentives in the 
decision making process. While major energy policy decisions should ultimately be taken by 
elected politicians, as they have democratic legitimacy, where incumbents have the type of 
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influence seen in the GB case, there is also a strong case for the creation of an independent 
voice51 – potentially in the form of a standing body – with a strong mandate to steer and 
inform those decisions in a forward-looking direction, as well as the resources and focus to 
deliver on that mandate. The Committee on Climate Change (CCC) and the National 
Infrastructure Committee (NIC) are examples of existing bodies that play such roles in 
relation to high-level decarbonisation and infrastructure planning respectively. Although 
neither the CCC nor the NIC have the specific remit or capacity to advise in detail on energy 
policy, a body that did so would need to take the advice and recommendations of these two 
existing bodies into account in reaching its own conclusions. 
Care would have to be exercised in the setting up and populating of such a body. On the one 
hand it would be essential that it is not dominated by the ‘usual suspects’ from incumbent 
industry actors, so there would be a need to step away from common assumptions about 
which actors have relevant knowledge and authority. On the other hand, such a body would 
need to have, or be able to draw on, independent sources of expertise given the complexity 
of the electricity industry. It would also have to have powers to access data and information 
from incumbent actors when required, possibly via the regulator, which already has some 
powers in this area.  
Such a body would of course also be lobbied, so to establish credibility it would have to 
operate in a completely open and transparent way. Informal closed meetings could not be 
part of this. In gathering evidence, it would also have to actively seek out the experience 
and views of smaller, less well-organised actors that have fewer resources to represent their 
perspectives on policy, with an explicit recognition that the playing field is not level.  
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An open approach would also be desirable because such a body should be encouraging and 
facilitating a public debate about sustainable energy transition and policies to support it, as 
such a public debate is missing in most countries (and certainly in the UK). These two 
functions should reinforce each other, for as Culpepper (2011) notes, established corporate 
actors are able to exercise influence with less scrutiny precisely in those in policy areas and 
on decisions that receive less attention from the public and from ministers, i.e. in what 
might be called ‘orphan’ issues. 
An independent body would not be able to develop the detailed design of policies once 
their key dimensions had been identified. However, for reasons that are clear from the 
analysis above, it should monitor the further development and report on any distortions 
that arise through lobbying at these stages. 
The case of DSR in the GB CM illustrates the challenges arising in the policy process in the 
midst of energy transitions. Normal policy making processes are not sufficient to meet the 




Appendix 1 – Interviews 
 
This article is based on research conducted on a wider study of the GB Capacity Market (CM) 
as a policy process. A number of interviews were conducted between July 2016 and January 
2018 for that research (see Table A1.1). Interviewees were identified initially based on the 
extensive knowledge of and networks in the GB energy policy world, and in later stages by 
snowballing. Not all those contacted were willing to give interviews. Several requested 
anonymity, which we have preserved across all interviewees. The interviews were semi-
structured, using bespoke interview schedules (available on request) that differed between 
interviewees depending on their knowledge or role in the process. As context, interviewees 
were told that the research was aimed at a better understanding of the process by which 
decisions were made in the CM, and the roles of energy companies in that process. 
 
 
Table A1.1: Interviews 
No. Date Position at time of CM process Role in process 
1 19 July 2016 Director of NGO Observer 
2 12 July 2016 Political advisor in government 2010-2012 Government participant 
3 19 July 2016 Regulation director in a Big Six company Observer from within 
incumbent 
4 21 July 2016 Manager in a Big Six company Participant from within 
incumbent 
5 27 July 2016 Senior official in DECC Government participant 
6 23 February 
2017 
Policy manager in a Big Six company Participant from within 
incumbent 
7 17 May 2017 Consultant Consultant and observer 
8 9 June 2017 Consultant Observer 




11 20 July 2017 Commercial energy lawyer Observer 
12 19 October 
2017 
Head of regulation in a Big Six company Participant from within 
incumbent 
13 10 January 
2018 








                                                          
1 https://www.nationalgrideso.com/balancing-services/demand-side-response-dsr 
2 See also https://www.theade.co.uk/resources/what-is-demand-side-response 
3 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62014TN0793&from=EN. 
4 For example, Chris Huhne, then Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, in ECCC 2011: 116. 
5 This view also applies to capacity mechanisms in other countries; see for example Van der Burg and Whitley 
2016: 35. 
6 The generation arms of these companies are: Centrica, EDF Energy, E.On, RWE, Scottish and Southern Energy 
and Scottish Power 
7 These responses can be found at: https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/electricity-market-reform 
and https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/possible-models-for-a-capacity-mechanism respectively. 
The Big Six and other large generating companies made submissions that are in the public domain; additional 
confidential submissions may have been made, but evidence from interviews suggest that the ideas 
considered important by policy makers were present in publicly available submissions. 
8 Interviews 1 and 4. The consortia consisted of: E.ON and RWE seeking to build two plants at Wylfa on 
Anglesey and Oldbury near Bristol; EDF and Centrica also seeking to build two plants at Hinkley Point in 
Somerset and Sizewell in Suffolk, and SSE and Iberdrola (owner of Scottish Power) together with GDF Suez 
seeking to build one plant in Cumbria.  
9 https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/electricity/wholesale-market/market-efficiency-review-and-
reform/electricity-market-reform-emr 
10 Interviews 1, 4, 5, 7, 9 
11 Interviews 1, 6 and 7 
12 Interview 1 
13 A minority of companies were opposed to an intervention. This may be explained by whether companies 
had recent or current investments in new CCGT plants at the time, and also by differences in corporate culture. 
14 Interviews 2 and 5. 
15 See e.g. written submission to ECCC (2012: Ev 139-140)  
16 See e.g. written submission to ECCC (2012: Ev 174-175)   
17 Interview 2. ECF is the European Climate Foundation 
18 Interview 1. Gottstein and a colleague produced a paper (Gottstein and Schwartz 2010) on the role of 
capacity markets in developing DSR in May of 2010, which was then subsequently cited in the December 2010 
EMR Consultation document. 
19 DONG in particular explicitly argued that generation-only solutions to intermittency were not desirable: ‘Any 
mechanism that is introduced must be flexible enough to accommodate smart grids, smart meters and 
demand side measures that will develop…’ (DONG 2010: 3); ‘Including cost-effective participation of DSR is 
fundamental to solving resource adequacy and security of supply constraints and any market intervention 
should be designed to allow participation and growth of this service.’ (DONG 2011: 6). 
20 Interview 4 
21 Interview 1 
22 Interview 7 
23 Interview 5 
24 The independent Panel of Technical Experts set up in 2013 to review the methodology for how the amount 
of capacity to auction was to be set also expressed concern that the government did not appreciate the role of 
DSR. 
25 Speech to the Economist energy summit, 23 June 2011, https://www.centrica.com/news/centrica-calls-
honest-debate-uk-energy-security 















33 Interview 11. Appearance at meetings varied, and information is only available for two CM working group 
meetings in September 2013, but these included 8 representatives from the Big Six and second tier generators 
and one DSR firm (Flexitricity) on one occasion, and 7 incumbent generators and 5 DSR firms (EnerNoc, Open 
Energi, Kiwi Power, Flexitricity) and the UK Demand Response Association on the other (at which DSR rules 
were discussed). See ‘Notes of the workshops so far’ at https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/electricity-
market-reform-emr-collaborative-development   
34 Interview 13 
35 Interview 13 
36 A point retrospectively acknowledged by one of the officials involved (Interview 5) 
37 http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/energy-and-
climate-change-committee/implementation-of-electricity-market-reform/oral/16339.html 
38 Interview 11 
39 Interview 11 
40 Interview 13 
41 Interview 11 
42 Interview 8 





46 For other studies that frame energy transitions in terms of competing coalitions see, for example, Hess 2014, 
Kungl 2015, Farla et al 2012 and Ullamen et al 2009. 
47 Interview 13 
48 Interview 11 
49 Interview 13 
50 As Helm (2014: 6) notes, ‘it is curious that capture does not feature in the appraisal manuals for new 
policies, in the scrutiny of legislation and in the design of interventions.’ It is worth noting that the government 
did make an explicit assessment of potential conflicts of interest for National Grid in taking on the role of 
delivery agent for the EMR, including the CM. 
51 This approach was followed within the CM in a limited saw in the creation of a Panel of Technical Experts to 
provide feedback on the methodology used for converting the reliability standard into capacity auction targets 
shows this, as it provided greater transparency about the process. However, the government also in the end 
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